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The Sunken Vessels of Chauncey and Yeo in Lake Ontario
Ben Ford

Naval power was central to controlling the Great Lakes and, by extension, the interior of North
America during the War of 1812. On Lake Ontario, the naval conflict took the form of an arms race with
virtually no actual engagements. As a result, few vessels were lost during the war. With the signing of the
Rush-Bagot Agreement, however, both belligerents sold vessels and put others in storage, resulting in the
wrecks of lost or abandoned war vessels all over the lake. Many of these vessels have been located and studied
over the last century. This paper reviews the vessels that have been studied, discusses what has been and what
can be learned from these vessels, and notes some of the shipwrecks that are still to be found.
La puissance navale était centrale pour le contrôle des Grands Lacs durant la guerre de 1812 et, par
extension, l’intérieur de l’Amérique du Nord. Sur le Lac Ontario, le conflit naval a pris la forme d’une course
aux armements avec presque aucun combat réel. En conséquence, peu de navires ont été perdus durant la
guerre. Cependant, avec la signature de l’accord Rush-Bagot, les deux parties belligérantes ont vendu des
navires ou les ont entreposés, ce qui a résulté en le naufrage de nombreux vaisseaux de guerre perdus ou
abandonnés dans le lac. Plusieurs de ces bateaux ont été localisés et étudiés au cours du dernier siècle. Cet
article examine ces navires, discute des connaissances acquises et celles pouvant encore être tirées de leur
étude, et présente certaines épaves qui restent à découvrir.

Introduction

The naval campaigns on Lake Ontario
were important in terms of controlling the
North American interior and the War of 1812
in general, as both sides struggled to control
this natural inland highway. But the campaigns
were largely strategic, with the squadrons of
Isaac Chauncey (American) and Sir James
Lucas Yeo (British) often jockeying for position,
rather than engaging in pitched battles. At the
beginning of the war, the British had a small
squadron of four vessels (Royal George, Earl of
Moira, Prince Regent, and Duke of Gloucester)
and dockyards at Kingston and York (now
Toronto), while the Americans had only one
purpose-built warship, Oneida, and no dockyard
(Malcomson 1998). Responding to this situation,
in September 1812 Chauncey established a
naval shipyard at Sackets Harbor, New York,
under the supervision of Henry Eckford (fig.
1). By late 1814, the Sackets Harbor naval station
was home to approximately 2,500 sailors and
marines, and would produce nearly ten warships
by the close of the war (Gibson 2012d). The
British matched the Americans, as both sides
strove to control the lake. Robert Malcomson
(1998) provides an excellent history of the war
on Lake Ontario, and, along with Kevin
Crisman (2014b), Malcomson (2004) places the
Lake Ontario theater within the larger naval
struggle for control of the Great Lakes and
Lake Champlain.

In many ways ship construction was the
war on Lake Ontario. With the exception of a
few skirmishes and amphibious attacks, there
were no all-out battles on the lake; instead, it
was something of a “cold war,” or what
Malcomson (1998: 225) has termed: “the war of
the dockyards,” as the shipbuilders at
Kingston and Sackets Harbor worked to give
their commodores a significant advantage in
vessels and cannon. This advantage never
came; the shipyards were too evenly matched,
and neither Chauncey nor Yeo would risk an
engagement that he could not definitely win,
because both understood the importance of
Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River for
controlling of the interior. Additionally, the
naval operations were regularly subjugated to
army needs, meaning that both commodores
were often fulfilling support roles, rather than
pursuing their own agendas (Malcomson
1998; Crisman 2014d). The result was much
maneuvering of squadrons during the sailing
season and feverish construction throughout
the war. Very few vessels, consequently, were
lost during the war, but many naval shipwrecks
from the period exist. This article summarizes
the archaeological potential of the squadrons
of Chauncey and Yeo.

Wartime Losses

Only three vessels were lost during the
war. The converted merchant schooners

134 Ford/Sunken Vessels in Lake Ontario

Figure 1. Map of locations mentioned in the text. (Map by author, 2013.)

Hamilton (ex-Diana) and Scourge (ex–Lord
Nelson) capsized during a storm on 8 August
1813. Their demise was recounted in a dramatic
style by Ned Myers in telling his life’s story to
James Fenimore Cooper, eventually leading to
the vessels’ discovery in a state of spectacular
preservation in 1973 (Cain 1983; Nelson 1983;
Cooper 1989; McAllister 2008; Moore 2014a).
Another converted merchantman, Magnet (ex–
Governor Simcoe and ex–Sir Sidney Smith), was
run aground and blown up by the British 10
mi. west of the Niagara River on 5 August
1814 in order to avoid capture by American
vessels Lady of the Lake and Sylph (Malcomson
1998:291–292). Additionally, there is likely a
wealth of War of 1812 bateaux, Durham boats,
and other small craft littering the bottoms of
Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. For
example, General James Wilkinson’s disastrous
1813 invasion of Canada left a trail of sunken
small craft from Sackets Harbor to the Salmon
River near Fort Covington, New York (Ashdown
2012). However, this article focuses primarily
on the larger, armed, sailing vessels produced
by the primary shipyards at Kingston and
Sackets Harbor.
It should not be surprising, however, that
the naval War of 1812 on Lake Ontario produced
only the wrecks of Hamilton and Scourge, the
smithereens of Magnet, and a number of yetundiscovered small craft. During the Battle of

Lake Erie, where Oliver Hazard Perry and the
Americans bested the British squadron in an
intense three-hour battle of 15 vessels, not a
single one was sunk. Recent archaeological
work, by the Great Lakes Historical Society, to
identify where the battle took place looked for
concentrations of iron shot on the lake floor, not
shipwrecks. The comparatively more cautious
strategies of Sir James Lucas Yeo and Isaac
Chauncey allowed the majority of the vessels
on Lake Ontario to survive the war and return
to their respective dockyards to await their
various fates. Thus, the naval stations at
Kingston and Sackets Harbor, which figured
so prominently during the war, were also
important in the postwar lives of these vessels
and the archaeological search for what remains
of the squadrons of Chauncey and Yeo.

Dismantling the Squadrons

The first vessels to leave the squadrons
were the small vessels. Not long after peace
was declared, the Americans sold the merchant
vessels they had bought or seized and then
armed at the beginning of the war to bolster
their forces. In some cases these vessels were
sold back to the same merchants who had
owned them before the war (Palmer 1984a).
These were the sister vessels of Hamilton and
Scourge, and included Duke of Gloucester, which
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the Americans had captured at York. Either
originally built as merchant vessels or small
enough to be adapted to the ports and economies
of the time, these vessels were readily employed
as trade rebounded on the lake.
The larger vessels were retained while the
details of the peace were sorted out. With the
signing of the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1818,
which limited the armament of Great Britain
and America to one vessel on the lake of not
more than “100 tones burthen and 18 pounder
gun,” the status quo that had persisted
throughout the war was formalized, and it was
time to disarm Lake Ontario (Malcomson 1998,
2004). The warships were placed in ordinary, or
storage, at their respective dockyards. They
were securely moored and cleaned, their decks
were boarded over to keep out water, and
they were staffed with a skeleton crew for
maintenance and to man the pumps (fig. 2).
Neither side was initially prepared to get rid
of its squadron; the vessels represented a
substantial investment, and it was an uneasy
time between America and Britain.
Despite having crews to maintain them,
decay began to set in, and plank seams began
to open up. Ship keepers on both sides of the
international boundary would periodically
find one of their charges resting on the bottom
of the harbor, usually listing heavily to one
side––neither a natural nor healthy position
for a vessel. By the early 1820s, most of the
American vessels at Sackets Harbor were being
described as “sunk and decayed,” and there was
an increasing call for their removal (U.S. Congress
1823, 1824) By 1825, much of the American
squadron had been broken up and removed
(Hugunin 1825). Anything usable from the

vessels was taken: fittings, nails, and bolts for
the iron; wood was likely sold for firewood or
as scrap. The stored vessels, with the exceptions
of Sylph, Madison, and Oneida, which were
refitted as merchant vessels, were nearly wiped
clean from the archaeological record. A similar
pattern took place at Kingston during the early
1830s, resulting in the breaking up of most of
the British squadron (Moore 2006, 2014b).
In the case of both nations, the destruction
of the squadron included vessels left on the
stocks. The battle for lake supremacy had gone
on right up to the declaration of peace and, in
some cases, for a few weeks afterward (Gibson
2012d). The British left Canada and Wolfe on
the stocks, and both were dismantled in the
early 1830s (Moore 2006). It is likely the
American ship Chippewa was also broken up at
approximately the same time (Gibson 2012d).
The massive 2,948 tons burden, New Orleans,
however, remained on Navy Point at Sackets
Harbor until the winter of 1883/4, becoming
something of a tourist attraction.
Nonetheless, the destruction of the
squadrons was not complete. Due to chance,
entrepreneurship, and a bit of laziness, the
remains of approximately a dozen British and
American warships endure. Of these, seven
have been discovered, and a similar number
may still remain to be found. Tables 1 and 2
summarize the disposition of the two squadrons
(Palmer 1984a; Malcomson 2004; Moore 2006,
2008, 2014a, 2014b; Swayze 2011; Gibson
2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d; Kopp 2012; Lardas
2012; Amer 2014; Crisman 2014a, 2014b,
2014d). Where there is a question about the
fate of a vessel or the identity of a wreck, the
disposition is modified with a question mark.

Figure 2. American squadron in ordinary at Sackets Harbor, ca. 1816. New Orleans is in the barn-like structure on
the right that dominates Navy Point (Hall 1818). (Image courtesy of Library and Archives Canada.)
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One of the jobs for future archaeologists and
historians is to locate the remains of the vessels
marked as “missing” or to show definitively
that they were destroyed with no chance of
physical remains.

Archaeological Remains of the Lake
Ontario Squadrons

As Canadian archaeologists have done a
much better job of locating and identifying the
physical history of the British squadron, it is
appropriate to begin with the wrecks north of
the international boundary. St. Lawrence was a
massive 102-gun ship, measuring 191 ft. long.
It would have looked at home among the
largest ships in the British saltwater navy, but
never saw action, as it was operational for
only the last months of the war. After being
laid up at Kingston for almost 20 years, the
“immense uncouth ark” was sold to Robert
Drummond, who had it pumped out and
towed from Navy Bay on the east side of
Kingston to the Morton Brewery west of town
(Moore 2006: 28, 2014b). The ship was then
sunk parallel to the shore, cut down to facilitate
access from the water, and attached to land
with a pier in order to make it a cordwood
wharf for refueling steamers. Constant impacts
from loading steamboats and the ravages of
waves and ice clearly took a toll on the hull, as
today all that remains is the lower portion of one
side of the vessel. Because neither the keel nor
enough of the ends survive, it is unknown which
side of the vessel is present (Moore 2006, 2014b).
While St. Lawrence was moved west, two
other vessels were moved east and sunk in
Deadman Bay. Burlington and Kingston were
both placed in ordinary at the Kingston Naval
Yard and then sold in 1832, but they were not
moved until sometime between 1839 and 1843.
At that time they were pumped out and towed
to a more out-of-the-way location east of Point
Henry, where they were deposited. These
wrecks have been well studied by Preserve
Our Wrecks, Parks Canada, and Texas A&M
University (Moore 2006, 2014b; Walker 2006).
In conjunction with St. Lawrence, Burlington
and Kingston, because they are so well preserved,
provide the best evidence of how the British
were building vessels on Lake Ontario. The
lower hulls of both vessels survive from the
keel to the turn of the bilge on the port side

and from the sternpost nearly to the stem. It
was this good state of preservation that finally
allowed both wrecks to be identified after being
un- and misidentified into the late 20th century
(Moore 2006, 2014b). These wrecks are open for
diving by the public and are accessible to scuba
divers interested in the War of 1812 period.
Two additional British vessels may have
been identified near the Kingston dockyard.
Montreal and Charwell (ex–Earl of Moira) are
known to have waited in ordinary alongside
St. Lawrence, Kingston, and Burlington before
being disposed. The hulk of Montreal may
have been towed out of Navy Bay and deposited
in deeper water, as what is known as Guenter’s
Wreck closely matches the dimensions of
Montreal in many ways (Moore 2008, 2012).
The likely remains of Charwell have also
recently been tentatively identified within
Navy Bay (Moore 2008, 2012; Kopp 2012).
While very promising, these wrecks require
further study to identify them definitively as
War of 1812 vessels. Finally, the Browns Bay
vessel is often discussed in conjunction with
Lake Ontario War of 1812 shipwrecks. The
wreck raised from Browns Bay is likely the
remains of Radcliffe, a gunboat launched in
1817 and eventually converted into a merchant
sloop (Amer 2014).
Two American wrecks also have been
studied by Canadian researchers. Hamilton and
Scourge both sank north of the international
line, in approximately 300 ft. of water. Their
depth led to phenomenal preservation, with
masts, figureheads, and armaments intact,
making these wrecks international stars when
they were discovered in 1973 (Nelson 1983).
The U.S. eventually transferred the wrecks to
the City of Hamilton, Ontario, and they were
made a Canadian National Historic Site. The
sites are protected under the Ontario Heritage
Act, which regulates diving, submersible, and
survey operations in their vicinities. This is
particularly appropriate, as these wrecks are
war graves, with skeletons noted during the
initial survey. More recently, both shipwrecks
were surveyed between 2007 and 2013 using
sonar systems to create three-dimensional
records of both vessels’ exteriors. This investigation found that the vessels were infested
with quagga mussels (Dreissena rostriformis
bugensis) (Moore et al. 2011; Moore 2014a).
These invasive mussels cause deterioration of
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Sylph

Jefferson

Jones

Mohawk

Superior

Chippewa

New Orleans

Armed Barges

Armed merchant
vessels (11)

1804 to
1811

1814

Building
1815

Building
1815

1814

1814

1814

1814

1813

1813

1813

1812

1809

Built

2 to 10

1 to 2

87

87

58

42

20

20

10 to 18

1

26

24

18

Guns

Destroyed,
missing, known
wrecks

Destroyed,
missing

Destroyed

Destroyed

Destroyed

Destroyed?

Destroyed

Known wreck

Missing?

Missing

Destroyed

Missing

Missing?

Disposition

Hamilton and Scourge lost in storm 1813; others sold 1815 and either fade from
historical record or are known to have been run aground and destroyed

Placed in ordinary at Storrs Harbor. One broke its mooring and drifted onto a sandbar. The others were sold and likely broken up ca. 1825

Never launched. Broken up 1883/4

Never launched. Likely broken up circa Nov. 1833

Ordinary at Sackets Harbor. Sold 1825 and removed 1825 or 1829

Ordinary at Sackets Harbor. Sold 1825 and removed ca. 1829, likely broken up

Ordinary at Sackets Harbor. Broken up and removed 1825

Ordinary at Sackets Harbor. Sold 1825, but never removed. Hull in Sackets Harbor

Ordinary at Sackets Harbor. Sold 1825. Sunk off Clayton 1843

Remained in service following the war. Sold 1826. Packet between Niagara and
Toronto. Lost Dec. 1826, 3 miles from Oswego. Rediscovered July 1827. Possibly
refloated as a vessel named Lady of the Lake was sold at Kingston in 1835

Ordinary at Sackets Harbor. Broken up and removed 1825

Ordinary at Sackets Harbor. Sold 1825, cut down to 302 tons, General Brady. Still in
use 1829. Does not appear in records of known losses

Ordinary at Sackets Harbor. Sold 1825, renamed Adjutant Clitz. Abandoned at
Clayton ca. 1837

Comments

Notes: Crisman 2014 a, 2014c, 2014d; Gibson 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d; Lardas 2012; Malcomson 2004; Moore 2014a; Palmer 1984a; Swayze 2011

––

Lady of the Lake

General Brady

Madison

––

Adjutant Clitz

Oneida

General Pike

Alternative
names

Vessel

Table 1: Disposition of the American Lake Ontario War of 1812 Fleet.
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Royal George

General Beresford, Prince
Regent

Sir George
Prevost, Wolfe

Lord Melville

Vittoria, Princess Charlotte,
Wreck Baker

Prince Regent,
Wreck Able

––

––

––

––

––

Niagara

Netley

Montreal

Star

Burlington

Kingston

Psyche

St. Lawrence

Canada

Wolfe

Gunboats

Various

Building
1815

Building
1815

1814

1814

1814

1814

1813

1813

1812

1809

1808

1807

1805

Built

2

118
planned

118
planned

104

56

56

42

14

23

12

20

12

12

10 to 16

Guns

Destroyed,
known wreck

Destroyed

Destroyed

Known wreck

Destroyed

Known wreck

Known wreck

Destroyed

Known wreck?

Destroyed

Destroyed

Destroyed

Missing

Known wreck?

Disposition

Broken up and removed 1830s, except Radcliffe (Browns Bay Vessel)

Never launched. Broken up 1830s

Never launched. Broken up 1830s

Ordinary at Kingston. Sold to Robert Drummond 1832. Used as wharf at Morton
Brewery

Ordinary at Kingston. Hauled out 1820s, broken up and removed 1830s

Ordinary at Kingston. Sold 1832. Sunk in Deadman Bay

Ordinary at Kingston. Sold 1832. Sunk in Deadman Bay

Ordinary at Kingston. Hauled out 1820s, broken up and removed 1830s

Ordinary at Kingston. Sold 1832. Possibly Guenter's Wreck near RMC

Ordinary at Kingston. Hauled out 1820s, broken up and removed 1830s

Ordinary at Kingston. Hauled out 1820s, broken up and removed 1830s

Destroyed to avoid capture, August 1814

Captured by Americans at York (Toronto), renamed York. Sold 1815, renamed
Eckford. Still afloat 1824

Ordinary at Kingston. Sold 1837. Likely Navy Bay Wreck

Comments

Notes: Amer 2014; Kopp 2012; Lardas 2012; Malcomson 2004; Moore 2006, 2008, 2014a, 2014b

Governor Simcoe, Sir Sidney
Smith

Magnet

––

Earl of Moira

Charwell

Duke of Gloucester

Alternative
names

Vessel

Table 2: Disposition of the British Lake Ontario War of 1812 Fleet
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wood and metal, and their added weight
could speed the almost inevitable collapse of
the shipwrecks.
While Hamilton and Scourge were converted
merchant vessels, only one purpose-built
Lake Ontario American warship has been
archaeologically investigated, the brig
Jefferson. Jefferson was sold with much of the
American squadron in 1825, but was only
partially salvaged, if at all. By 1825, the hull
was lying on its port side behind Navy Point
at Sackets Harbor, possibly allowing salvagers
to break up the exposed starboard side (fig. 3).
If they did not, locals seeking firewood almost
certainly did. Naval shipbuilding had nearly
deforested the region around Sackets Harbor,
and wood had to be transported several miles,
at a steep cost, for many years after the war.
The rest of the hull, however, remained largely
undisturbed in Sackets Harbor into the 20th
century. During the first quarter of the 1900s,
the stern was dynamited by the New York
State Militia in a spate of harbor clearing.
Additionally, the construction of Navy Point
Marina in the 1960s resulted in pilings being
driven through the wreck. Some of the pilings
passed harmlessly though gun ports, but
others damaged the hull. Jefferson’s remains
were investigated in the 1980s by Kevin
Crisman, providing the foundation for the
understanding of American shipbuilding on
Lake Ontario during the War of 1812
(Crisman 1989, 2014a). This wreck is also the
most accessible of the War of 1812 vessels.
With permission, it is possible to walk out on
the marina docks and see portions of the hull
lying on the marina bottom, making this vessel
a very tangible part of War of 1812 heritage.
The fact that Jefferson survived in Sackets
Harbor after it was sold and supposedly
broken up raised the question of whether
other wrecks are still in the area. One other
large vessel, likely Mohawk, remained in the
harbor until 1829, when William Vaughan was
contracted to remove it (Mordecai 1828a,
1828b, 1829). It is not clear how he removed
the vessel, however. One possibility is that he
refloated the already-demasted hull and
dumped it in the middle of Black River Bay,
just outside Sackets Harbor, where the water is
approximately 60 ft. deep. A side-scan sonar,
magnetometer, and sub-bottom profiler survey
of Black River Bay was conducted to test this

proposition. The survey revealed no wreck or
portion of a vessel consistent with Mohawk
(Ford et al. 2012; Gibson 2014). It appears that the
hull was dumped in this location, but is no
longer present; was deposited farther out in
the lake; or, most likely, was broken up in the
harbor and removed.
Similar to Mohawk, there was some possibility
that 15, 75 ft. long armed barges built by the
Americans near the end of the war were still
extant. Like much of the squadron, the armed
barges were placed in ordinary in 1815, but at
Storrs Harbor, rather than Sackets Harbor.
Near the end of the war, the U.S. developed a
second shipyard at Storrs Harbor, approximately 3 mi. northeast of Sackets Harbor, to
build Chippewa, which was never completed
(Gibson 2012d). One of the armed barges
broke its mooring in a storm sometime before
1818 and drifted onto a sandbar near the junction
of Muskellunge Creek and Black River Bay
(U.S. Naval Forces on Lake Ontario 1818;
Gibson 2012d). The location of this armed
barge is indicated on an 1829 chart and possibly
appears as a small, unnamed obstruction on
another chart seven years later (Vinton 1829;
Stockton 1836). After 1836, the wreck was no
longer indicated on charts, and it is unknown
whether it was covered by the shoal, removed,
or destroyed. The remaining 14 armed barges
were still in Storrs Harbor in 1825, but resting
on the bottom when they were sold (Adams
1825). At least three of these vessels were later
removed to Sackets Harbor, but the fate of the
rest is unknown (Gary Gibson 2014, pers.
comm.). In order to investigate the possibility
that these boats were allowed to remain in Storrs
Harbor after they were sold, a magnetometer
and “shuffling” survey was conducted in the
harbor. The results of the survey were negative,
suggesting that the armed barges had been
removed from the harbor. As for the 15th
armed barge that wrecked on the sandbar, a
magnetometer survey and ground penetrating
radar survey conducted from the frozen lake
surface suggested that something was buried
near where the 1829 chart marked the wreck.
An excavation in this area, however, did not
uncover any evidence of a shipwreck. It is
possible that this armed barge is still buried in
the bay, but its location remains unknown
(Ford et al. 2012).
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Figure 3. Hull of Jefferson lying behind Navy Point with the New Orleans shiphouse in the background (Everts
and Holcom 1878).

While it is becoming clear that New Yorkers
were brutally effective in clearing warships
from their harbors during the 19th century,
there is still the potential that vessels sold out
of the service may survive as shipwrecks.
Madison was sold in 1825, cut down to 302
tons, and renamed General Brady. The vessel
was still in use in 1829, but fades from the
historical record and does not appear in
records of known losses (Swayze 2011; Gibson
2012b). This brig, which was two times larger
than most of the merchant vessels operating
on Lake Ontario, may have been too large to
be viable. However, size alone may not have
been the cause of its short career. Oneida and
Sylph also were nearly 300 tons and served
merchants for more than a decade after being
sold out of the service, so it is equally possible
that the postwar modifications that reduced
Madison from 580 to 302 tons may have
affected its sailing qualities. Madison likely
ended its career, similar to many smaller merchant vessels, in a breaker’s yard; however, it
may have also been abandoned in some quiet
bay, waiting for an archaeologist to stumble
across its hull and to raise questions about its
odd construction.
Oneida and Sylph also were converted to
merchant vessels, but their final resting places

are better known. Both vessels eventually
found themselves in the lumber trade, one of
the major industries on Lake Ontario in the
early 19th century. Both vessels were abandoned
in the late 1830s or early 1840s off Clayton,
New York, a major lumber port, where sticks
of timber were assembled into rafts to be
floated down the St. Lawrence River to
Montreal (Palmer 1984a, 1984b). It is unclear,
however, what happened to these vessels after
they were abandoned. It is possible that one
was largely broken up and eventually buried
in fill near the current site of the Wooden Boat
Museum, while the other may have been
incorporated into a pier (Watertown Herald
1888; Gibson 2012a, 2012c). There is a local
tradition that Oneida is located beneath the
municipal dock in Clayton; however, the
possible remains have not been seen since the
1970s (McCarthy 2009).
Lastly, Lady of the Lake still may remain to
be found. This small schooner was built for
speed and appears again and again in the
historical records, all over the lake, carrying
information and keeping tabs on the British.
Lady of the Lake was purchased by John
Rodgers of Oswego in 1826, and after a season
of serving as a packet between Niagara and
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Toronto was returning to Oswego when it was
lost in a December storm (Colton 1876; Bureau
of Marine Inspection and Navigation 1911).
Interestingly, the wreck was noted the following
August, 3 mi. from Oswego, in “deep water ...
masts and booms lying at her sides where it
would seem they had been lashed previous to
her sinking” (Freeman’s Advocate 1827). It is
unknown whether the wreck was allowed to
remain on the bottom after its discovery, or it
was refloated and put back into service. Finding
this shipwreck, if it remains, would address the
mystery of its loss, while simultaneously
adding considerably to the understanding of
American War of 1812 ship construction and
the development of the Baltimore-clipper
vessel type.

The Value of War of 1812 Shipwrecks

While there is clearly room for more
work on Lake Ontario War of 1812 ships and
shipwrecks, archaeologists can begin to see
patterns in the available data. In many ways
the American and British shipbuilders paralleled
each other throughout the war. As Robert
Malcomson (1998) has effectively argued, each
side was matching the other, gun for gun, and
in many ways the vessels existed as a byproduct,
a way to get guns onto the lake. The parallels
run deeper, however, and both sides had similar
responses to the strategic advantages and
limitations of operating on the lake. Both sides
were building vessels with sharp hulls (Moore
2012) (fig. 4). A sharp hull is one that slopes

steeply from the keel to the turn of the bilge,
offering less water resistance, but sacrificing
provision space and safety. While these vessels
were also shallower than oceangoing warships,
they were, nonetheless, designed to operate in
the open lake and to dock in the few deep
harbors at places like Kingston, Sackets
Harbor, and Niagara, not to take advantage of
the more common shallow harbors around the
lake. With their home ports always within 193
mi., it was possible to build shallow but sharp
hulls because they did not have to carry many
provisions (Crisman 2014c). Clearly, both
sides were modifying what they knew of ship
construction to match the environment and
needs of naval warfare on Lake Ontario. They
were building specific vessels for specific uses
in specific parts of the lake. While these vessels
were fast and handy, these characteristics came
at the cost of safety. The Jefferson crew was
forced to jettison half its guns in an 1814 storm
to keep from sinking, and a recent study of the
American schooners Newash and Tecumseth on
Lake Huron reinforces just how prone to capsizing
these vessels were (Crisman 1989, 2014a; Gordon
2009; Gordon, Hoskins, and Heinold 2014).
Similarly, both shipyards were working
under incredibly demanding construction
schedules; turning out vessels in months,
sometimes weeks. Based on the known
archaeological examples of Jefferson, Kingston,
Burlington, and St. Lawrence, the shipbuilders
were building solid vessels, but to save time
they often opted to replace complicated joinery

Figure 4. Simplified midship profiles of Oneida, Jefferson, and Burlington. Note that Burlington and Jefferson have
more rise to their floors and sharper bilges than the pre-war Oneida. Profiles are based on Chapelle (1949),
Crisman (1989), and Moore (2006); not drawn to scale. (Figure by author, 2013.)
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with more wood (Crisman 1989, 2014a, 2014c;
Moore 2006, 2012, 2014b). In Jefferson, for
example, the curved timber knees that support
the deck in most wooden vessels built before
and after the War of 1812 were replaced with a
heavy clamp that attached the deck to the
sides. Omitting the knees saved time because
there was less timber to shape, but also made
Jefferson less durable, especially in rough weather
(Crisman 1989, 2014a). Similarly, neither the
British nor the Americans took the time to cut
limber holes––the little notches in the frame
bottoms that allow water to drain toward the
pumps. This omission, again, shaved time off
construction, but, in combination with the
green timber used by both shipyards, made rot
an imminent inevitability. The British vessels
also demonstrated a surprising amount of
variation in hull construction (Moore 2006,
2014b), suggesting that individual shipwrights
were given a free hand to solve design and
logistics problems, rather than relying on
standard protocols. Thus, the vessels of both
sides were fast to build, fast to sail, but neither
entirely safe nor durable. As Noah Brown put
it in describing the vessels he was building on
Lake Erie:
[W]e want no extras; plain work, plain work
is all we want. They are only required for one
battle; if we win, that is all that will be
wanted of them. If the enemy are victorious,
the work is good enough to be captured.
(Malcomson 2004: 90)

These hull designs and expedient decisions,
as well as the size of the vessels, made it difficult
for the Americans to sell their vessels after the
war. The Lake Ontario warships of America
and Great Britain were built specifically for
war, not the average ports or cargo needs of
merchant vessels. A vessel that was prone to
capsize spectacularly or to rot quietly from the
keel out was not necessarily a good investment,
even at a reduced cost. While removing the
cannon and reducing the amount of sail would
have made these vessels less dangerous, it is
not unreasonable to hypothesize that hull
design contributed to the loss of Lady of the
Lake, remembering that it was a notably fast
vessel in a squadron of vessels that regularly
traded speed for safety. Lady of the Lake is also
notable because its size (89 tons) put it in the
range of merchant vessels of that period. The
merchant vessels purchased or seized by the

Americans at the beginning of the war averaged
78 tons displacement, and by the third decade
of the 19th century the average lake vessel
displaced only 150 tons (Minnesota Historical
Society 2012). Thus, it is little surprise that
Lady of the Lake, Oneida (262 tons), Sylph (300
tons), and the modified Madison (302 tons)
were the only American vessels that were
purchased by merchants; the next-smallest
vessels were Jefferson and Jones at 500 tons
displacement (Gibson 2012b; Lardas 2012).
Cargo shipments at this time were generally
small, and filling a large vessel simply meant
more risk of loss and that fewer ports could be
served. While the Americans had some success
disposing of their smaller vessels to local
merchants in 1825, the Royal Navy did not
attempt to sell any of its vessels until 1831,
when St. Lawrence was sold. By the time the
Royal Navy held a second auction in 1836, the
remaining vessels were likely so decayed that
they were only suitable for scrap. Radcliffe, the
sole British War of 1812-era vessel converted to
merchant service, was likely sold between
1831 and 1836 (Amer 2014). The final parallel
between the squadrons of Chauncey and Yeo
was the difficulty in getting rid of the vessels.
Even when the vessels were sold or a contract
was taken to remove them, buyers seem to
have been inclined to leave many of the hulks
lying around long after they were to have been
removed.
If the remains of Oneida or Duke of Gloucester
can be identified, or the wreck of Charwell
substantiated, it will allow for a comparison
between vessels built before the war and those
built during it (Kopp 2012). These vessels, all
launched between 1805 (Earl of Moira) and
1809 (Royal George and Oneida), were purposebuilt warships designed to operate on Lake
Ontario, but were not subject to the exigencies
that dominated the wartime arms race. A
comparison of these vessels will shed light on
how drastically hull design and construction
was adapted during the war. If it is ever possible
to record the interiors of Hamilton and Scourge, this
comparison can be expanded to understanding
differences between merchant ships and warships
on Lake Ontario before the war. Furthermore,
if more of the American wartime vessels
(Madison, Sylph, and Lady of the Lake) can be
identified and studied, this will allow a fuller
comparison of British and American adaptations
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to Lake Ontario and rapid shipbuilding. The
known British vessels demonstrate a wide
variety of building techniques, suggesting a
lack of centralized control, but it is currently
unknown whether the American shipbuilders,
under the direction of Henry Eckford at Sackets
Harbor, employed more or less standardized
techniques.
Ultimately, the study of the Lake Ontario
squadrons may be important beyond the history
of the War of 1812. Henry Eckford was a
master of his trade (Chapelle 1949). He trained
Isaac Webb, who, in turn, trained John
Griffiths and Donald McKay, all giants of 19thcentury shipbuilding. The War of 1812 was a
pivotal time for Eckford, and it has been argued
that his Lake Ontario designs influenced his
later work and that of his apprentices
(Crisman 1989, 2014a). Eckford’s Lake Ontario
designs, unfortunately, are currently missing,
if they ever existed. It is possible that he took
them to Turkey, where he spent the end of his
career building warships for the Ottoman
Empire, but, at present, the only record of his
Lake Ontario work is the archaeological
record. An archaeological evaluation of his
work, beyond Jefferson, will allow a fuller
understanding of the development of
American shipbuilding generally and the
clipper ship specifically.
It is also possible that the yet-undiscovered
War of 1812 shipwrecks in Lake Ontario might
shed light on the development of the modern
navy. In particular, the armed barges may contain
information about the use of centrally
designed ship draughts to plan vessels built at
remote naval stations and the employment of
systematized construction techniques in the
mass-production of vessels. Both these practices
were in their infancy in the U.S. at the time of
the War of 1812, but were widely adopted in
merchant and naval construction by midcentury (Thiesen 2006).
Prior to the 19th century, the majority of
warships built in the U.S. were designed and
constructed at individual shipyards. In these
instances, the constructor or shipwright would
plan and oversee construction of the vessel
from start to finish and would have sole
responsibility for its characteristics (Chapelle
1949; Goldenberg 1976). This independent
approach to ship construction is evident in the
large vessels built at Sackets Harbor. Henry

Eckford designed and oversaw the construction
of eight warships, all of which had unique
characteristics that identified them as Eckford
designs created specifically for the Great Lakes
(e.g., sharp, fast, and shallow hulls) (Crisman
1989, 2014a, 2014c; Malcomson 2004). For his
smaller armed barges, Eckford had access to
plans drafted in 1813 by William Doughty, the
chief naval constructor of the U.S. Navy
during the War of 1812 (Malcomson 2004). The
introduction of centrally planned construction
can be traced to the 17th century in the Royal
Navy, but the U.S. adopted the practice more
slowly (Winklareth 2000). For example, Noah
Brown used the Doughty draught to build the
row galley Allen on Lake Champlain, but made
several alterations to the design to simplify the
construction and to adapt to shortages in
particular shapes of wood (Emery 2003, 2014).
It is unknown whether or how Eckford
changed the Doughty plan to accommodate
issues of available materials, time constraints,
the environment of Lake Ontario, or his ego.
Analysis of the Doughty draft, Allen, and a
Lake Ontario armed barge would contribute to
a better understanding of how this early attempt
at centralized control of ship construction was
put into practice, how effective it was, and
how it led to the development of the more
formal modern navy.
Similarly, the massive accumulation of
labor and materials required to build, not only
the 15 gunboats, but also the 6 warships
begun, if not completed, during 1814, argues
for significant organization on the part of the
U.S. Navy and Henry Eckford. There has been
no study of how this organization translated
into vessels, but other fleets built under times
of war stress, such as Benedict Arnold’s Lake
Champlain fleet of the Revolutionary War and
the Emergency Fleet of World War I, suggest
the employment of systematized construction
to speed shipbuilding (Bratten 1997;
Winklareth 2000; Thiesen 2006). Systematized
construction burgeoned as the 19th century
progressed, and shipbuilding became more
industrialized. Ultimately, ship construction
transitioned from a craft to an industry, and
the American Lake Ontario squadron, the
armed barges in particular, may represent an
early stage in that transition. There is much
more to be learned from these vessels.
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